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Interoception has been determined to be an elemental aspect of the neural foundations
of physiological homeostasis, subjective experience, and motivated behavior. This
paper reviews current neuroscience research regarding interoception and forms of
interoceptive dysfunction that may result in psychopathology, focusing on depression,
and anxiety, in a manner conducive to psychotherapists engaging with it to consider
clinical applications. Pertinent aspects of interoceptive system processes in relation to
psychopathology are addressed: Functional interoceptive ability and the forms of its
expression, the difficulty of accurate measurement of such within an individual or group,
interoceptive inference processes and perturbations. Predictive coding, considered in
this context as interoceptive inference, a process that integrates bottom-up and top
down lines of neural information emerging from themultitude of bidirectional, anatomically
hierarchical connections the insular cortex makes with other cortical, and subcortical
structures, will be addressed regarding its place in psychopathological formulations.
Clinical vignettes will elucidate how interoceptive disturbances might present in the
therapeutic relationship, supporting the evaluation and application of scientific theory,
and research findings by psychotherapists. The clinical implications of this neuroscientific
research have received little attention in the psychotherapeutic setting. Increasing
the knowledge base of psychotherapists and furthering awareness of the functional
interactions of body and brain toward the creation of healthy and psychopathological
experience benefits the patient. There is immediate need for the translational expression
of scientific findings into the psychological evaluation of patients, therapeutic process,
and treatment. While it may seem distant and unrelated to the affective processes that
occur within the psychotherapeutic exchange, neuroscience adds a unique perspective
from which to observe and live such experience for the therapist and patient. With
the therapeutic relationship as the backdrop, a scientific perspective will support
psychotherapists’ comprehension of their patients’ experience and the process of
change, either through direct information, or the development of different perspectives
from which to observe and interact with their patients. This paper will serve not only
as a guide for psychotherapists concerning this expanding knowledge base, but also a
source for neuroscience researchers intent on formulating research protocols that could
produce clinical benefit.
Keywords: interoception, depression, anxiety, psychotherapy, interoceptive dysfunction, mindfulness, predictive
coding, interoceptive inference
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INTRODUCTION
“What do I feel?” Dana said, with a confounded look on her face.
“I don’t really know how to answer that question-every time I look
inward all I can imagine is as if I am sitting inside a box looking
out at the world and the box has a glass front, but inside the box my
body is a wooden statue-I can see the world but the world doesn’t
see me. It is as if I am invisible and can’t feel anything in response to
the world, or if I can, I am only looking out at the world and don’t
have any words for any feeling, I can only sense that glass wall. Is it
always going to be like that?”
There are many different approaches to conceptualizing
psychopathology within the psychotherapeutic setting. The
inclusion of the patient’s bodily experience is too often
undervalued in evaluation of health and psychopathology
by clinicians. Concurrently, as neuroscience researchers seek
to include the phenomenological experience of the patient
in the study of bodily-based psychopathological experience,
there is not enough interdisciplinary exchange with treating
clinicians to place this scientific information in a context with
clinical meaning. Interoception is a neurophysiologic process
that bridges the gulf between exploratory research and clinical
implementation. Interoception, a vital process that sends neural
information from the body to the brain, regulates life processes
at the most basic levels, while also modulating emotional
experience and subjective awareness at the most complex levels.
It is the “process of how the brain senses and integrates signals
originating from inside the body, providing a moment by
moment mapping of the body’s internal landscape” (Khalsa
and Lapidus, 2016). As an elemental aspect of homeostatic
physiological functioning, interoception substantiates the felt
experience of the body, and (subjective cognitive-affective)
experience, thus ultimately influencing behavior. The time has
come for therapists, in our treatment of psychopathological
disorders, to delve into comprehending this important concept,
gaining an experiential understanding of the neurophysiologic
processes that create our patients’ psychological experience, and
expanding our scientific and theoretical understanding of our
patients and our clinical work.
Homeostasis is a process that organizes basic life processes and
determines physiologic balance in the body. Craig (2015) asserts
the basic purpose of homeostasis is “energy-efficientmaintenance
of the integrity and health of the body in support of the well-being
and advancement of the individual and species.” Furthermore,
Harrison et al. (2010) claim that “the central representations of
organism physiological homeostasis constitute a critical aspect
of the neural basis of feelings.” The interoceptive sensations
arising from the body allow for a continuous monitoring and
neural representation of the homeostatic state of the body
through neural, hormonal, immunological, proprioceptive, and
behavioral processes (Craig, 2008, 2010). Interoception, which
instantiates homeostasis, is thus a vital element of healthy
functioning, and disturbances in interoceptive processes on any
level could create pathologic dysfunction within the individual. It
is true that the complexity of the system is daunting; interoceptive
dysfunction can lead to psychopathology and psychopathology
can incur interoceptive dysfunction. Interoceptive dysfunction
stems from different sources: (i) the interoceptive signals
themselves may be dysfunctional (e.g., not getting through from
the body to the brain stem), or (ii) our perception of them
may be biased by disorder at neuroanatomic centers, or (iii)
there may be something wrong with how we top-down interpret
them. As Dunn et al. (2010) note, “It can be speculated that
some symptoms or disorders lead to elevated or diminished
responses in the body, whereas others are associated with better
or worse perception of these bodily changes, and yet others lead
to different appraisals of the significance of these changes.”
Psychotherapeutic treatment, to be effective, must disturb
homeostasis on some level to allow modification and change
in characteristically managed processes. As neuroscience now
appreciates that the brain is in a body and the body is in
the world, psychotherapists have more and new information at
our disposal to address how to support an individual in the
life-changing process that requires experiential instability while
facilitating a new state of stability. Interoception is the progenitor
of the felt sense of the body. Every meaningful therapeutic
encounter must qualitatively evaluate interoceptive activity and
homeostatic balance, albeit within relational evaluation rather
than physiological parameters, and relay a sense of safety to
the patient’s body through relational consistency, compassion,
interest, cues such as tone and prosody of voice, eye contact,
and physical gestures. Engaging with the patient’s experience at
a level without words, i.e., preverbal or non-verbalized, known
to the patient as the felt experience in their body, supports
the evocation, and expression of experience. Comprehending
the available neuroscience research is not necessary to be a
psychotherapist, but it adds an immediacy, significance, and
substance to the experience of treating a patient, increasing the
clinician’s felt sense of the relational experience, encouraging new
perspectives on our patients, and deepening our respect for the
difficult work of change.
Neuroscience is now trying to understand not the brain
as a passive filter or assimilator of information and cues, but
rather to understand brain function in terms of predictions
or inferences, and how nervous system processes facilitate
constructive interactions with the relational world to support
change and growth. Research on the influence of top-down
signals on the neuroanatomical processes that interoception
initiates has opened up a whole new “world view” regarding
how neural processes that predict the next moment based on
prior moments generate experience on all levels for an individual,
from the simplest behaviors to the most complex processes of
selfhood. This is exemplified in constructs such as predictive
coding and interoceptive inference, which move the discussion
of interoception and homeostasis away from a bottom-up process
that simply recognizes body states (Seth, 2013; Seth andCritchley,
2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015). The circular causality between
body and brain, or between physiology and mindful experience,
presents a window of opportunity for both neuroscientists and
clinical therapists.
Unfortunately, insufficient communication and collaboration
between the research community and the clinical community
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is resulting in limited clinical applicability of research findings.
Gallese (2014) calls for closer coordination between psychiatry
and cognitive neuroscience in evaluating the cause and
treatment of psychopathology, lamenting that psychiatry has
been neglecting the experiential or first-person experience of
the patient lately, instead “there is an over-focus on reliability
(operational concepts).” Although Gallese is addressing both
cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry specifically in this
editorial, he defines psychopathology as stated by Jaspers
(1997) to be a “disturbance of mental phenomena (Hoenig and
Hamilton translation, 1997),” a definition certainly acceptable
to any discipline studying and treating the many types of
“disturbance” reflected psychologically in subjective and
relational experience, psychophysical expression, or behavior.
Gallese insists that it is imperative that researchers and clinicians
work together with more purposeful and direct collaboration
regarding the study, comprehension, and delineation of
psychopathology, especially from the patients’ experiential
perspective (Gallese, 2014). This review is meant to serve
as a paving stone in the development of a road connecting
disciplines, leading to greater integration of psychotherapeutic
process gleaned from the hours clinicians have lived with patients
with neuroscience research supporting that explores basic life
processes such as interoception may lead to psychopathology.
Through multiple lines of research neuroscience, is proving
how interoception is a basic building block of not only
physiological experience but also psychological experience (e.g.,
Cameron, 2002; Craig, 2004, 2010, 2015; Critchley, 2004; Singer
et al., 2009; Paulus and Stein, 2010; Seth et al., 2011; Critchley
and Nagai, 2012; Gu et al., 2012, 2013; Herbert and Pollatos,
2012). After a review of basic neuroscience concepts and
neuroanatomy relevant to interoception, research and theory
regarding interoception and psychopathology will be considered.
Firstly, how differences in interoceptive perception may result
in disturbed sensitivity, awareness, or report of interoceptive
sensations in depression and anxiety. Secondly, proposals will
be presented, modeling how interactions between interoception,
higher cortical processes, and the autonomic nervous system
result in subjective experience. Finally, the clinical implications
of the research findings will be summarized, especially regarding
interventions that are proposed to address how interoceptive
disturbance can be mediated through processes that facilitate
change toward healthier functioning.
This review will not address psychopathology as a disturbance
in emotional processes per se, rather as disturbances in
homeostatic processes and of embodied experience as related
to interoceptive dysfunction, with feeling, somatic, cognitive,
and relational disturbances a concurrent result. The intent of
this paper is not to prescribe further definition of operational
concepts and scripted standard of care processes. Rather,
the intent is to allow an inclusion of the physical body
in clinical work, if only through verbal interaction and
within the therapist’s clinical evaluation processes, through
an understanding of how disturbance and dysfunction in the
basic process of interoception, and thus the life-regulating
process of homeostasis, bring patients to our door seeking help.
There are generally recognized patterns of symptoms associated
with depression and anxiety, although each disorder may be
organized into different sub-categories. For depression such
symptoms are somatic disturbances in vegetative functions,
anhedonia, excessive guilt and rumination, decreased energy,
and decreased psychomotor activity. Anxiety is associated with
states of hyperarousal—called anxiety or panic, worry, avoidance,
increased bodily tension, poor concentration, and increased
apprehension.
To encourage clinicians to recognize how such research
findings are relevant in everyday relational encounters,
process-oriented clinical vignettes will be interjected amongst
neuroscience research findings. While not defining the
particulars of a patient’s demographics, past history, or social or
relational setting, these vignettes are intended to help clinicians
through recognition and memory of similar encounters with
their patients past and present, and through such associations
facilitate understanding of the scientific material presented.
These short passages of descriptive material are offered to trigger
a picture or a sense of a patient a clinician may have treated,
thus adding depth and color to the black and white nature of
the research, supporting a deeper intuitive comprehension of the
material, and subsequently a more meaningful translational use
of such information within the clinical hour.
OVERVIEW OF INTEROCEPTION,
HOMEOSTASIS, AND RELATED
NEUROANATOMY
In the midst of the patient’s description of her father’s fight with
cancer, the therapist commented softly,“You really don’t want your
father to die, do you?” Colleen stuttered and said, “No,” and was
quickly going to continue speaking. As the therapist observed that
Colleen was breathing shallowly, tears had appeared in her eyes,
and the furrow in her brow had just deepened considerably, the
therapist asked her to pause, and inquired, “What’s going on?”
Colleen answered slowly, “I don’t know, when you said that just
now, I felt something here, (pointing to her high chest), but now it is
not there.” “Gone completely?” the therapist inquired. “Well, there
is some tightness and heat a little bit, but if I try to sense it any
more, it’s like it’s gone.” “How about you don’t think about it, you
just feel it, like you would a sore muscle?” Colleen pauses and looks
pained. “Can you say anything about it now?” She pauses again and
looks slightly frustrated, “It seems like if I think about it or focus on
it there, my brain shuts down, just stops.” “Ok, then don’t think or
try to find words, just stay with sensing it physically.” Colleen was
quiet, chuckled, and said, “Well, I don’t know if I really like that
option, either.”
To better comprehend interoception and related scientific
research, an overview of homeostasis and the autonomic nervous
system (ANS) will be presented. As interoception instantiates
homeostasis (Craig, 2015) and the ANS links homeostatic signals
to functional output, it is necessary to have a basic understanding
of such systems before looking at the bigger picture.
As you read this description of the finer levels of neural,
anatomical, or perceptual processes; remember that emotional
experience and awareness occur as an emergent process across
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systems. As Fogel (2009) succinctly states, interoceptive processes
do not de facto lead to emotional awareness, “awareness emerges
as a whole systems phenomenon, a consequence of these (insula,
orbitofrontal cortex) and other regions of the brain and body in
the interoceptive network.” The insula and related anatomic areas
that are essential for interoceptive processing and homeostatic
balance, and implicated in interoceptive dysfunction, will take
primacy in this review.
HOMEOSTASIS AS A BASIC BUILDING
BLOCK OF EXPERIENCE
The term homeostasis was coined by Cannon (1939) regarding
the process of how human beings maintain physiological
equilibrium amidst the inherent instability of the body’s internal
processes and the changing circumstances of the external
environment. Cannon notes this does not mean that the body
reaches a stable, non-varying state; rather homeostasis is “a
condition which may vary, but which is relatively constant.”
He quotes the French physiologist Charles Richet, who wrote
that although a “living being” must be stable so as “not to be
destroyed, dissolved, or disintegrated by the colossal forces, often
adverse, which surround it” (Cannon quoting Richet, 1932),
it must also have an inherent instability. Maintaining stability
requires that such a being must also be “excitable and capable
of modifying itself according to external stimuli and adjusting its
response to the stimulation.” Cannon, in his description of the
functionality of homeostasis can be understood to reference the
intricate dance between stability and change that we require and
seek as humans for our psychological selves:
“...every complex organization must have more or less effective
self-righting adjustments in order to prevent a check on its
functions or a rapid disintegration of its parts when it is subjected
to stress. And it may be that an examination of the self-righting
methods employed in the more complex living beings may offer
hints for improving and perfecting the methods which still
operate inefficiently and unsatisfactorily” (Cannon, 1939).
Before research advances made in recent decades, neuroscientists
would explore such “self-righting adjustments” from the
perspective of the brain, and psychotherapists would consider
only the experiential as relevant in the creation of necessary
characteristic “self-righting methods” in individuals. Neither
adequately recognized the importance of considering a functional
synthesis between body and mind, or disturbances in such a
synthesis resulting in psychopathology because of “methods
which operate inefficiently and unsatisfactorily.” More recently,
neuroscientists, moving away from a brain-centric position,
have allowed constructs like feelings and experience to enter
into consideration, opening a window of opportunity for
both scientists and clinicians. This window places therapists
in a position to exploit—and contribute to—recent shifts
in neuroscience. The powerful “self-righting” processes
of homeostasis with its neurally presented interoceptive
underpinnings, which also directly implement the development
of subjective experience, mark a critical entry point into such an
engagement between disciplines.
Craig (2010, 2015) theorizes that a sense of self results
from a “cortical (that is, mental) integration of salience across
all conditions” at any moment in time, with homeostatic
processes determining what is salient to the individual.
He proposes an overarching model regarding interoceptive
experience and the production of subjective awareness or
“sentience.” The foundation of this model is the perception
of neuronal interoceptive signals as sensations, or “feelings”
(Craig, 2010). Such signals generate pain (pricking or burning
pain), temperature, itch, hunger, thirst, muscle burn or ache,
joint ache, sensual touch, flush, visceral urgency, nausea, among
other sensations. All of these sensations are associated with
an “obligatory affect (pleasantness or unpleasantness)” (Craig,
2008). At any given moment, the pleasant or unpleasant quality
of such interoceptive sensations imbues this sensation with
a motivation for the individual, to move toward or away
from the sensation, consciously or not, while causing reactive
responses in the autonomic nervous system (Craig, 2008,
2010). The responses to such motivation may be evidenced
in many ways, such as beliefs, feeling states, and gross motor
behaviors.
Johnston and Olson (2015) declare “feelings from the
body (interoception) represent a homeostatic readout that
can induce motivations to achieve homeostatic balance when
needed.” As emotions are considered to be experiential
states that stem from motivations regarding the positive
or negative value of any internal or external stimulus,
the interoceptive flow of neural signals from the body
provides essential information (consciously known or not)
regarding the nature and valence of such stimuli (Rolls,
1999; LeDoux, 2002; Solomon, 2008), ultimately generating
responses on many levels, including behavior, always toward
homeostasis. Farb et al. (2015) assert, “Maintaining desired
physiological states is critical for an organism’s survival, and
so interoception is a powerful motivator of behavior in
the pursuit of these states (Craig, 2002, 2009).” From birth
onward an individual responds to motivation stemming from
homeostatic imbalances which over time are expressed in
characteristic responses, ultimately determining the character
and personality of the individual. Therapist must deepen
their comprehension of the science behind such life processes
to increase their awareness and respect for the constraints
the need for homeostatic balance places on the experience
of our patients. Understanding the forces at play within
homeostasis, such as interoception and how such forces are
generating subjective experience, and ultimately behavior for
our patients allows for multi-dimensional evaluation and
treatment.
ANATOMICAL CONSIDERATIONS
REGARDING INTEROCEPTION
For a more comprehensive description of the neuroanatomic
areas related to interoception see Box 1.
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BOX 1 | SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF RELEVANT NEUROANATOMY.
Interoceptive afferent fibers enter the brainstem and terminate in the Nucleus of the Solitary Tract (NTS), the Parabrachial Nucleus (PBN), and the Periaqueductal
Gray (PAG). These brainstem nucleii are largely involved in homeostatic control processes. Afferent fibers continues on to the Ventromedial Nucleus of the
Thalamus, and then to the posterior insular cortex (PIC), progressing through the different portions of the insula instigating and reactive to synaptic transmission
from other neuroanatomical nuclei and organs. Such exchanges within neuroanatomic areas at multiple synaptic layers and levels is termed “hierarchical,” with
signaling occurring bidirectionally, between areas that are next to each other anatomically, and also layers that are not immediately adjacent (Rauss and Pourtois, 2013).
Within the PIC the interoceptive pathway produces a topographical representation of the body from anterior to posterior aspects (Craig, 2015). The middle
insular cortex (MIC) has connections to the amygdala and hypothalamus, and exteroceptive stimuli centers (Craig, 2011). This area integrates interoceptive signal
with other inputs, e.g., ANS fibers, and “forms a combined representation of homeostatically salient features of the individual’s internal and external environment”
(Craig, 2011). The anterior insular cortex (AIC) has been shown to be an integrative site, representing “a common neural substrate for embodied and experiential
processes” (Harrison et al., 2010). The right AIC has been explicitly implicated in the mapping of interoceptive state and response to heartbeat detection tasks
(Critchley et al., 2004). The AIC is described as a coordinating site for “high level homeostatic information, perhaps about the overall state of the body, which is an
important component of emotional experience and a sense of well-being” (Simmons et al., 2012).
The Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) mediates the motivational and cognitive aspects of experience through connections with the AIC and autonomic
effector systems and the functional co-activation of the AIC and the ACC is necessary for many aspects of subjective experience and behavior. The ACC is
responsible for the motoric elaboration of subjective feelings represented in the AIC (Critchley, 2009), thus the ACC, is labeled the “motor limbic cortex” and the AIC
is considered the “sensory limbic cortex” (Craig, 2015).
Interoceptive afferent fibers (afferent—from the body to
the brain; efferent—from the brain to the body) originate
in receptors that are situated in all tissues of the body
and then travel to the brain through small diameter fibers
within a layer of tissue, or lamina, in the spinal cord
(Craig, 2008). The interoceptive sensations arising from the
body allow for a continuous monitoring of the state of
the body through mechanisms such as heart rate, blood
pressure, respiration, tension in musculature, immune system
reactivity, proprioceptive signals, sensual touch, visceral activity
such as gastrointestinal, and genitourinary sensations (Craig,
2008, 2010). Such fibers are always active and reporting the
physiological condition of the body constantly to the brain. At
the level of the brainstem, the pathway becomes bidirectional,
capable of receiving, and sending signals, with bidirectional
(afferent and efferent) fibers of the autonomic nervous system
joining the pathway. An important parasympathetic nerve, the
vagus, brings sensory information from the heart, within these
fibers.
In a seminal study, Zaki et al. (2012) examined the
“anatomical overlap between interoception and emotion,” using a
design that required participants to attend to sensations from the
body while concurrently assessing their emotional experience.
Objective measures were evaluated regarding the level of
subjects’ interoceptive accuracy using heartbeat perception tasks,
and quantified activation in certain brain areas was gathered
using fMRI results. The findings showed increased activity
specifically in the right Anterior Insular Cortex (AIC) and
Inferior Frontal Operculum (IFO) when attending to bodily
experience while monitoring emotional experience. The activity
in these regions also correlated with the reported intensity
of emotions that the subjects reported during various trials.
Zaki et al. (2012) assert the findings verify that “emotional
experience is intimately tied to information about internal bodily
states.” Garfinkel and Critchley (2013) point to these findings
as supporting other findings that assessing one’s feeling state
involves interoceptive processing of changes in body state, and
also correlate them to a study by Terasawa et al. (2012), that
further identifies the bilateral AIC as “a neural substrate active
in both the cognitive evaluation of bodily state and appraisal of
self-emotion.”
The AIC is considered to integrate emotionally and
motivationally salient input from closely related regions such as
the ACC, orbitofrontal cortex, and striatum so as to integrate “the
behavioral agent with the feeling self ” (Craig, 2010). There has
been some question as to whether the AIC is the actual last stop
on the train regarding the development of subjective experience.
Damasio (2010) and Damasio and Caravalho (2013) disagree
that it is the AIC and assert “the neural substrate of feeling
states is to be found first subcortically and then secondarily
repeated at a cortical level” and the “subcortical level would
ensure basic feeling states while the cortical level would largely
relate feeling states to cognitive process such as decision making
and imagination.” Thus, they theorize that while the insula has a
part to play, they assert it is the brainstem and other subcortical
structures functioning together that produce summary subjective
experience. Barrett and Simmons (2015) also disagree with
the concept of the AIC as the central anatomic structure
responsible for emotional awareness and a sense of presence. In
their model it is the “multiple pathways within the combined
cortical interoceptive network and the ascending pathways can
construct interoceptive perceptions” that summarily creates such
experiences.
It is necessary to recognize the inherent value of the
bidirectional transfer of Autonomic Nervous System
(ANS) information occurring along the neural pathways
carrying interoceptive information into and out of the
brain. This arrangement quickly allows for evaluation of
the environment and essentially immediate responses to
stressors through ANS processes. Porges (2011) asserts
such bidirectional flow of ANS signals supports “the
ability to sense and regulate internal physiological state
(which) is at the base of competencies in higher order
behavioral, psychological, and social processes.” ANS
processes are lateralized in the AIC, with the parasympathetic
input represented in the left AIC, and sympathetic input
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in the right AIC (Craig, 2015; Johnston and Olson,
2015).
INTEROCEPTIVE ABILITY
The day prior to Linda’s session, she had received treatment
for her temporomandibular joint pain from an experienced
physical therapist who began treatment by helping her adjust her
posture. Linda described how the physical therapist had observed
her for a moment and gently moved her back, shoulders, and
neck into proper alignment, and then asked how that felt. She
answered, “Uncomfortable.” When the physical therapist asked
“Uncomfortable, or unfamiliar?” Linda reported that she replied
“unfamiliar” and “I just burst into tears.” She went on to say the
physical therapist was not surprised by her tears and reassured
her that happens for many people in that situation, and then said,
with tears, “I had no idea I would cry so suddenly, I was just
looking for relief from this tenseness and pain in my jaw, and then
when I answered her question—I’m surprised at my response. How
could such a little adjustment and her comment have me crying so
quickly?”
The neuroscience community is working hard toward gaining
consensus regarding many aspects of interoception, as elemental
as a collective definition, nomenclature, and common research
protocols. Khalsa and Lapidus (2016) and Farb et al. (2015)
describe interoception as a process that can be broken
down into different facets, e.g., attention, discrimination,
detection, accuracy/sensitivity, among others. In research into
interoception, such facets of interoception are evaluated as an
overall level of ability to experience and report interoceptive
sensation with some degree of objective accuracy. Practically this
ability can then be measured and quantified in an experimental
situation, using different interoceptive stimuli, e.g., heartbeat,
gastric distension, or respiratory load. For example, in the
experimental testing of the ability to count one’s heartbeat
over a certain period of time (heartbeat perception or HBP),
while considered an interoceptive ability, is recognized to
include such facets as attention and discrimination, which
may influence its quantification when measured under different
conditions. While most researchers agree that interoceptive
ability can be measured as points of greater or lesser ability
along different dimensions signifying objective or subjective
processing, the definition, measurement, and labeling of
interoceptive ability is still inconsistent in the neuroscience
literature.
Garfinkel et al. (2015) highlight the extensive confusion
regarding the measurement and labeling of interoceptive ability
and propose a standardization of terminology. For example, they
note that the terms interoceptive awareness and interoceptive
sensitivity have been used synonymously and interchangeably
to label an objective measure of interoceptive ability, which they
purport is actually a person’s ability to accurately determine the
interoceptive stimulus under question. They set out to clarify
distinct qualities related to the objective measure, subjective
report, and subjective accuracy regarding the objective measure.
To do this they measured interoceptive abilities in healthy
individuals, intent on distinguishing interoceptive ability
along three dimensions: Objective (interoceptive accuracy),
subjective (interoceptive sensibility), and “correspondence
between objective interoceptive accuracy and subjective report
(interoceptive awareness).” Their tests of such processes in
healthy adults using HBP tasks did distinguish between these
dimensions of interoceptive ability and they assert “that
interoceptive accuracy is the central construct underpinning
other interoceptive measures,” i.e., interoceptive sensibility
and interoceptive awareness. They further assert that the use
of consistent terms that denote interoceptive ability along
distinct dimensions will be helpful in discerning the clinical
significance of differences in interoceptive ability to pathology.
For the purposes of continuity of comparison across research
studies, the terms defined by Garfinkel et al. (2015) will be used
to refer to the different dimensions of interoceptive ability as
tested in the research studies cited throughout this paper (see
Box 2).
On a practical level, Schulz and Vögele (2015) claim the
interoceptive perception of bodily processes requires three
stages: (1) visceral signaling from the body to the brain,
(2) the directing of attention toward sensation from the
body, and (3) evaluation of such signals for their subjective
meaning. Perception of interoceptive stimuli/experience
is believed to develop early in life, and is considered a
stable constitutional trait (Garfinkel et al., 2015) similar to
temperament (Mallorquí-Bagué et al., 2016). Such perception
of interoceptive experience differs greatly amongst individuals,
and while fundamental to the awareness of emotional state,
“a person’s sensitivity to internal bodily responses may
be a better determinant of emotional style, predicting
one’s vulnerability to emotional disorders and the capacity
to regulate one’s own emotional state” (Garfinkel et al.,
2015).
The implications of an individual’s ability to subjectively
detect and objectively report interoceptive sensation related
to different organ systems is under scrutiny through many
different research protocols, as is how the experience of
interoceptive sensations results in symptomatic disturbances
in some individuals but not others. Garfinkel et al. (2015)
note that “interoception interacts with cognition and emotion,
making measurement of individual differences in interoceptive
ability broadly relevant to neuropsychology.” The ability to
sense interoceptive flows of information from the body is not
consistent across individuals and measurements of such are
meaningful in the consideration of the clinical implications
of increased or decreased ability to perceive interoceptive
sensation. Critchley and Garfinkel (2015) comment on the
relative import of such studies that find correlation between HBP
with other interoceptive stimuli evaluation allows “inferences
about an individual’s more general sensitivity to internal bodily
responses and arguably, by extension, their impact on emotional
processes.”
As we explore here research delineating interoceptive
processes within different categories of psychopathology,
memories of one patient or another will occur to an interested
therapist regarding the patient’s typical reactions along the
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BOX 2 | INTEROCEPTIVE ABILITY TAXONOMY.
Interoceptive accuracy (IAc): Objective measurement; e.g., Heartbeat Perception (HBP) tasks, gastric distension. Garfinkel et al. (2015) note this measure is intended
to “objectively quantify individual differences in behavioral performance.”
Interoceptive sensibility (IS): Subjective measurement; e.g., questionnaires; subjective scoring during a task. Garfinkel et al. (2015) assert this measurement
does not necessarily relate to accuracy of perceived interoceptive stimuli rather it is the “individual’s belief in their interoceptive ability and the degree to which they
feel engaged by interoceptive signals.”
Interoceptive awareness (IAw): Metacognitive awareness; an equation that quantifies the amount of interoceptive accuracy relative to the subjective confidence
the individual has regarding their performance on a task; as noted above evaluating whether an individual is subjectively accurate about the objective measure of
interoceptive perception (Garfinkel et al., 2015) claim this “highlight(s) the relationship between subjective (perceived) and objective (actual) interoceptive ability.”
dimension of interoceptive ability, considering the patient’s
overall characteristic propensity toward accuracy (objective),
sensibility, (subjective), and awareness (whether you know how
accurate you are), and how they are reflected in the patient’s
characteristic experience, character, and psychopathology.
RESEARCH FINDINGS IN ANXIETY AND
DEPRESSION
As Karen entered the room, she nodded hello and walked quickly to
her seat, talking excitedly as she sat down. “I called the pharmacy
on the way to get my father’s prescriptions expecting there was
one last refill on them, but nooooo, I couldn’t pick it up on the
way—it just messes everything up!” Although the therapist knew
that Karen was the primary caretaker for her elderly father, this
amount of agitation over a straightforward task seemed heightened.
“How is that?” the therapist asked. “It is always something, I was
feeling good yesterday, not so hopeless, well, now here it is again,
it’s all hopeless!” she exclaimed. The therapist hearing a familiar
statement, and recognizing Karen was speaking from a persistent
position she held about her sense of value in the world, asked, “How
is that?” Karen replied after a moment, talking a little more slowly,
“I can just see him (her father) sitting there unhappy, it feels like I
have to do something to make it better for him, I’m responsible for
how he feels. “I feel so depressed.” She was silently crying, looking
away from the therapist. Slowly, the therapist spoke, “And, how is
that?” Karen looked up, “You’ve already asked me that question,”
she said warily.
Making direct eye contact, the therapist said, “I know, can you
hear how I asked the questions again in your head, do they have the
same sound?” After a long pause, Karen replied, “No, they don’t.
How is that?’ she repeated. “That is a place that is all too familiar, I
get so scared and feel so bad, like from my body inwards I am just
bad, it’s like—no matter what I do I can never be a good thing in
his eyes.” She paused again and said slowly, “I can feel just a bit of
loosening, lightening, right here (pointing to the center of her chest),
as if it is saying that how it feels just isn’t true, just doesn’t have to
be, ‘cause no matter how it feels inside me, I am not a bad thing.”
As Bonnie witnessed another patient in group yell loudly in
an expression of anger, her eyes widened, she put her hand over
her mouth and looked purposefully out the window. The therapist
called her name, and engaged her in conversation, asking, “What’s
going on, Bonnie?” She replied, “I don’t know, it is just scary, just
scary.” “Is it dangerous?” the therapist inquired. “I don’t know, it’s
so loud in my head, not out here!” The therapist asked again, “Is it
dangerous?” Bonnie replied, “My head says no, it says no! But my
body says, just, well, it just says- I don’t know and I want out! But
each time I keep on finding out that it turns out ok, so I am staying
now, even if I am scared.”
This review will focus on research regarding depression and
anxiety. While there are differences in terminology regarding
interoceptive ability, as noted above, and also different levels
of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and subsets of anxiety
within the neuroscientific literature, an attempt is made here to
organize such categorization for the purposes of comparison. The
chosen studies are meant to highlight interoceptive dysfunction
as reflected in the expression of affective, cognitive and behavioral
symptoms in these disorders.
Pollatos et al. (2007) examined the “interrelationships between
experienced emotion intensity, anxiety, and interoceptive
awareness” using HBP tasks. They found a significant correlation
between Interoceptive Accuracy (IAc) and trait anxiety, similarly
to Critchley et al. (2004). They also determined by regression
analyses that IAc was amediating factor between trait anxiety and
the “experienced intensity of unpleasant pictures,” or negative
feeling experience. They note such findings suggest an association
between IAc and changes in body state that occur during
emotional experience.
Pollatos et al. (2009) studied the association between IAc,
depression, and trait anxiety, as measured by heartbeat tracking
methods using counting, and depression measured by the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). They did note that the
level of depression as measured in the subjects for this study
indicated only mild or moderate levels of depression but
not severe depression. Within that population there was a
negative correlation between HBP and depression, with higher
depression scores correlating to lower IAc. They evaluated the
interaction between anxiety and depression, finding that anxiety
was associated with increased IAc, with the negative correlation
between depression and IAc reaching significance only in subjects
with high anxiety, not low anxiety.
Domschke et al. (2010) and Garfinkel and Critchley (2013)
summarily note that IAc has been found to be elevated in anxiety
disorders. There are varying hypotheses regarding possible cause
and effect relationship of these findings. Domschke et al. (2010)
propose that such an elevation might increase vulnerability
to anxiety, “by increasing the perceptual base for catastrophic
interpretations of cardiac symptoms,” with the increase in
Iac promoting increase in anxiety through altered cognitive
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interpretations of sensations. Garfinkel and Critchley (2013)
point out that as anxiety patients in remission even show higher
than usual interoceptive accuracy (Ehlers et al., 1995), this may
be because of the constitutional quality of interoception could
promote vulnerability to anxiety in individuals. Interestingly,
the results of Daubenmier et al. (2013) present both sides
of these studies but examine the effect of life processes on
such experiences, evaluating IAc in subjects who meditate.
They evaluated IAc using a respiratory stimulus paradigm and
heartbeat tracking, finding higher IAc to be associated with less
anxiety and lower Interoceptive Awareness (IAw) by subjective
report among meditators compared to non-meditators. They
theorize such findings may relate to the quality of interoceptive
awareness generated by such sensitivity. They theorize that a
“non-evaluative” awareness of the interoceptive accuracy by the
meditators may involve lower responsive anxiety and also be
reflected in less subjective experience of interoception.
Furman et al. (2013), evaluating depressed patients without
concurrent anxiety, found decreased Iac in subjects with MDD
compared to controls. Furthermore, within the MDD group they
also found that patients with lower Iac exhibited less positive
affectivity and more difficulty in decision-making paradigm
tasks. They state these findings indicate that for subjects with
MDD, “disrupted perception(s) of bodily responses reduces
both the experience of positive arousal and the ability to use
interoceptive feedback to inform decision making.”
While the research findings about interoceptive ability
regarding depression and anxiety are not all in agreement, there
are trends noted in each disorder. IAc is generally found to be
lower in depressed individuals (Pollatos et al., 2009; Khalsa and
Lapidus, 2016) and higher in anxious people (Domschke et al.,
2010; Mallorquí-Bagué et al., 2016). Reports of differences in
insula activation are becoming more common. Initially, subjects
with varying levels of pathology were grouped together, with
disparate findings among groups reflecting this, especially for
depression (Pollatos et al., 2009; Dunn et al., 2010). In general,
evaluation of depressed subjects has found lower activation in
the insula (Khalsa and Lapidus, 2016) but higher activation in
anxious subjects (Alvarez et al., 2015).
Paulus and Stein (2010) consider similarities between the
symptoms expressed in depression and anxiety processes and
hypothesize a model of dysfunction including the insula and
disturbed interoceptive that focuses on altered responses to
internal body signals, or afferent interoceptive signals, due
to an initial disturbance in the anticipatory state of the
individual regarding what such signals mean. They assert that
because of an individual’s “increased bias toward negative self-
view (depression) or increased attentional bias toward threat
(anxiety),” the interpretation of interoceptive afferent signals
is distorted relative to this bias. Paulus and Stein (2010)
propose “external cues or internal thought processes generate an
anticipation of aversive body states that sets up a body prediction
error, i.e., the difference between the current and anticipated
body state. This body prediction error acts as a motivating signal
for individuals to withdraw (depression) or avoid (anxiety)”
They theorize such an persistent distortion in interpreting
the interoceptive flow of information accurately in relation to
the present moment (and not their biased interpretation of
the stimuli of the present moment) ultimately leads to the
symptoms of depression (withdrawal) or anxiety (avoidance).
Citing research studies that implicate the insula and related
neuroanatomical areas in disturbances in self reassurance (Longe
et al., 2009), worrying (Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004), anticipation
of aversive events (e.g., Nitschke et al., 2006; Simmons et al.,
2008) they note that “taken together, these data suggest that the
insula plays an important role in processing the anticipation
and subjective experience of aversive stimuli across a number of
different modalities” (Paulus and Stein, 2010).
Avery et al. (2014) evaluated naturally occurring interoceptive
attention to visceral experience comparing interoception in
subjects with MDD and healthy subjects. They asked subjects
to discern the perceived intensity of sensation from their heart,
stomach, or bladder for periods of 10 s at a time while in an fMRI
scanner, thus stimulating interoceptive signals from different
organ systems and evaluating interoceptive perception, while
simultaneously measuring the extent of activation in different
neuroanatomic areas through fMRI evaluation. The fMRI results
showed less activity in the dorsal mid-insular cortex (dmIC) in
subjects with MDD, with a significant negative correlation of
MDD symptoms to quantified BOLD signal activity in the dmIC
during tasks measuring interoceptive accuracy. Thus, patients
with greater symptoms of MDD had lesser activity in the dmIC.
Also, specifically during HBP tasks Avery et al. (2014) found a
negative correlation between insula activity, depression severity
and somatic symptom severity. Thus, with greater depression and
somatic symptoms they found lower insula activity. They claim
such findings denote the dmIC as “a primary viscerosensory
region of the insula,” which is shown in this study to be “critically
affected” in MDD, possibly reflected in the findings of decreased
Iac and increased somatic symptoms in MDD patients but not
controls.
Kawaguchi et al. (2016) evaluated patients with social
anxiety disorder (SAD) regarding any difference in insular
volume from controls. The results of their study showed a
significantly lower insular volume bilaterally in subjects with
SAD compared to controls. Discussion of the results addressed
the role of the insula in interoception and current considerations
of “misinteroception” resulting in SAD patients recognizing
“their somatic symptoms, such as blushing or trembling, as
hazardous alarm to self, which reinforce their negative cognitions
(Paulus and Stein, 2006).” Kawaguchi et al. (2016) also note the
importance of the insula, along with ACC connections, in the
saliency network, proposing that alterations in the insula could
disturb the functioning of this network, resulting in improper
grading of stimuli import and subsequent symptoms of SAD such
as negative social cognitions, social withdrawal and avoidance.
A recent study by Hyett et al. (2015) concerning the symptoms
of “melancholia” or “endogenous depression” is relevant
regarding hypothesized functional network connectivity between
the insula and other neuroanatomic areas and subsequent
MDD symptoms. Using functional MRI protocols the authors
evaluated differences in the functional network processes
and disturbances of concentration and attention of patients
with melancholia (predominant symptoms; psychomotor
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disturbances and anhedonia) relative to non-melancholic
depression. They note such symptoms are indicative of somatic
preoccupation, rumination and difficulty in shifting attention
between spontaneous thoughts. Their study focused on
functional connectivity between certain circuits of brain activity
(called “modes”) during periods of “spontaneously generated
thought” as they note “much of the illness burden is experienced
through unpleasant and dysphoric affects during spontaneous
thought” in melancholia. They found diminished connectivity
between key networks that are important in attention and affect
regulation in melancholic patients, particularly between the
insula and executive mode circuit, which “includes key regions
(e.g., vmPFC) subserving affective control mechanisms.”
Wiebking et al. (2015) evaluated Iac while simultaneously
measuring functional MRI (fMRI) results of depressed, remission
from depression, and control participants, using two distinct
tasks for each group: (1) HBP counting (interoceptive) and
(2) response to an external tone (exteroceptive). They found
that controls and patients whose depression had remitted
showed more right anterior insula activity when attending to
heartbeats than when attending to external tones, while patients
with depression showed no such difference in insula activity
when attending to either internal or external stimuli. The
authors point out that as the insula is theorized to play an
important role in integrating interoceptive and exteroceptive
stimuli and producing a sense of self (Craig, 2010), such a lack
of differentiation in insular activity between internal and external
stimuli inMDDpatientsmay be reflected as symptoms of “altered
self-awareness in depression.” Furthermore, evaluating fMRI
results across groups they found reduced overall activity in the
anterior insula only in the MDD group during tasks measuring
IAc, which they assert might support the fMRI evaluation of
insular response as a “state marker” for depression in the
diagnostic evaluations of patients.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Robert was a medical doctor whose anxiety had always focused on
his actions hurting others. For example, he imagined contracting
a disease which he then would pass on to someone he loved who
would die from it. After much productive work in his therapy,
he could recognize his ruminations were not likely accurate, his
anxiety was less, and he was better able to describe his affective
experience. Upon the death of the brother with whom he was closest,
his anxiety surged again, and a constant sense of fear and dread that
he would miss a clinical symptom or sign, thereby harming someone
caused him to ruminate frequently during his work day. He would
brood over encounters with patients, finding multiple ways that his
ineptness or lack of attention to detail would cause the patient harm.
He was inundated constantly with feelings around the idea that
he hadn’t done something and that hastened his brother’s death.
“I just want to stop ruminating, but my anxiety just kicks it up.”
In session 1 day as he spoke about his anxiety and surety that “I
am going to miss something and it will be bad, and that is all
I can think about the whole day” his therapist interjected “What
do you feel in your body as you say that now?” Silence, and then
he responded, “Something in my belly.” His therapist invited him,
“Look at me and try to find more words for that feeling.” His eye
contact held, tears began to well-up in his eyes, and he said slowly,
“I can feel a weight dropping and dropping through me, like I
am falling into a bottomless pit, it feels so real.” He continued to
quietly cry and yet maintain eye contact over several minutes, his
breathing ultimately deepening, his eyes lightening, and his forehead
becoming less furrowed. “How is this now?” his therapist asked.
“Certainly not as scary as all the time I spend alone in my head,
but I can feel the line shifting constantly between feeling what is in
my body and going back to that circular loop running in my head,
all the while trying to see you.”
Thus far we have looked at approaches neuroscience researchers
are using to address relationships between interoceptive function
and psychopathological conditions. Models are being proposed
to account for the interaction of bottom-up interoceptive neural
signals from the body with top-down neural signals from
neuroanatomic centers, producing experience on multiple levels,
e.g., emotional, psychological, cognitive. While there are several
choices regarding such models, we will focus in this review on
the role that predictive processes are proposed to play, as they
account well for homeostatic processes and the power of, “more
or less effective self-righting adjustments” (Cannon, 1939) that
develop over a lifetime as a person seeks to manage the inherent
affective vulnerability of being human, but which can produce
symptoms of depression or anxiety.
Harshaw (2015) thoroughly reviews the extant literature
regarding studies of interoceptive dysfunction and depression,
grouping them according to task and findings. He proposes
three paths, ultimately interrelated functionally, through which
interoceptive dysfunction can lead to and increase depression.
These are “(a) alteration of neural substrates for interoception”
whereby neuroanatomic centers responsible for interoception
are disturbed through the effects of stress, and neurological
disturbances, among others and, “(b) the loss of situational cues
ordinarily used to disambiguate interoceptive signals, due to
situational or behavioral changes, like withdrawal.” Noting that
as a person’s social situation from depression changes through
symptomatic withdrawal and isolation, lessening available social
networks, this may cause a loss of “exteroceptive scaffolding for
interoception,” decreasing resources with which to distinguish
bodily signals. Subsequently the depressed person may be
more vulnerable to misinterpretation of both social cues and
interoceptive stimuli, resulting in, “(c) shifts in attention or
awareness, due to cognitive tendencies like analytic self-focus
and rumination” (italics in original). Harshaw further addresses
how other functional processes such as exteroception, the
autonomic nervous system, insular function and connectivity,
and social processes, immune system factors, among others,
intersect at the level of interoception, and contribute to ongoing
interoceptive dysfunction in depression. He claims that “focus
on interoception thus provides a novel means of elucidating not
only the poorly understood connection between mind, body, and
psychosocial context but also the gender bias in the epidemiology
of depression.”
If one considers that human beings at a basic operational
level do not like uncertainty, or perturbations of homeostasis and
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ultimately subjective experience (Friston, 2009), neuroscience is
attempting to account for how the brain and body participate
to create a stable, relatively predictable perspective of inner
and outer experience at any given moment through models
grouped together under the rubric of “predictive coding” (Clark,
2016). The implications of such models are that the mind, or
brain, while constantly making inferences or predictions about
experience, is essentially trying to minimize surprise (Friston,
2009). Of course, for an infant, with very limited resources for
managing the experience of physiological processes and emotion
and before the ability to comprehend cause and effect, life is a
constant surprise. The characteristic means employed to generate
physiologic balance (homeostasis) throughout the infant’s and
child’s varied internal and external environmental experiences
may be life preserving.When such processes prevail in adulthood
as patterns that are inconsistent with the reality of the moment,
they often result in psychopathology that requires conscious,
mindful awareness in order to change.
In depression and anxiety, a core symptom is a non-adaptive
and inaccurate evaluation of internal sensations and external
reality. For individuals with such disorders the evaluation of the
input of their body and the external world results in characteristic
experiences that create a consistent sense of distressing disorder,
with fear a constant companion, and persistent beliefs that any
incoming information from the self or the environment cannot
be trusted. Research is slowly determining the intricacies of
the neurobiologic processes that create ongoing estimations, or
“predictions,” by the brain about internal states and external
reality, in relevant areas such as the AIC, ACC, frontal operculum
(FO), and orbitofrontal cortices. Theoretical models utilizing
Bayes Theorem (see Box 3) propose how the brain determines
perception and experience with accuracy or distortion regarding
reality using statistical formulas, denoted as “predictive coding”
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Friston, 2009, 2010; Friston et al.,
2012). Such predictive coding models propose to account
for the interaction of interoceptive neural signals from the
body with top-down neural signals through such prediction-
based processes to instantiate numerous aspects of subjective
experience (Singer et al., 2009; Seth et al., 2011; Clark, 2013, 2016;
Seth, 2013; Seth and Critchley, 2013; Pezzuolo, 2014). Current
research has been focusing on proving how predictive coding
processes can be integral in emotional awareness, selfhood, and
other aspects of subjective experience. After a review of the
research it will become apparent how interoceptive dysfunction
at any level can involve disruption of the hierarchical processing
proposed in such models, causing psychopathology.
The concepts of predictive coding and prediction error can be
applied beyond providing an account of how the brain adjusts its
internal model of how sensations are caused, creating perception.
Applying such concepts to how we move can explain action
and behaviors. For example, if afferent (from the body part
to the spinal cord) predictions about the state of our body
produce prediction errors (proprioceptive) that are eliminated
by engaging classical reflex arcs (returning from the spinal cord
to the body part) movement can be generated quickly. This
is a simple perspective on the engagement of motor reflexes
regarded as acting out afferent predictions—or when responding
to predictions about how one is to move, labeled active inference
(Friston, 2010).
These same active inference processes are applicable to
interoception and homeostasis, where autonomic reflexes can be
considered to be innately responsive to top-down (homoeostatic)
predictions. Using the terms of physiology and neurobiology,
physiologic balance homeostatically maintains a set point, i.e., a
prediction, which is a quantifiable measure encoded in neuronal
firing rates in the brain reflecting the interoceptive status of the
body. Prediction error is the difference between sensory inputs
from the body and descending predictions from the brain (i.e.,
the homoeostatic set point) that excite and inhibit certain brain
cells. Thus, the change in the cell firing rate, quantified as the
difference in the cell firing rate after excitation and inhibition,
emerges as a neural signal and encodes prediction error.
These neurally processed prediction errors subsequently ascend
to higher brain centers along dedicated neural pathways to
update expectations or beliefs at higher levels of representation,
providing more accurate iterations of descending predictions
from cortical areas (top-down) to areas receiving interoceptive
input (bottom-up) from the body (which subsequently reduces
prediction error). Accordingly, Khalsa and Lapidus (2016) assert
that when prediction errors have been reduced to zero a body
can be said to be in homeostasis. Within this description,
interoception rests on sensory inputs from the body, while
homoeostasis and autonomic reflexes can come to be an integral
part of perception—and implicit beliefs about the state of the
world, including one’s own body. This is labeled interoceptive
inference (Seth, 2013; Seth and Critchley, 2013).
Seth and Critchley (2013) further elaborate an “interoceptive
predictive coding model” with the “anterior insular cortex
(providing) a natural locus for comparator mechanisms”
anatomically for the process. Seth (2013) notes within the
AIC there is “evidence of substantial cross-talk between
levels of viscerosensory representation, including top-down
cortical and behavioral influences to brainstem and spinal
centers,” with feelings/experienced emotions “hypothesized
to depend on the integrated content of these predictive
representations across multiple levels (Seth et al., 2011).”
Seth and Critchley (2013) assert that interoceptive predictive
coding, or interoceptive inference, occurs through “hierarchically
cascading top-down interoceptive predictions that counterflow
with bottom-up interoception prediction errors” summarily
determining subjective feeling states, with behavior also resulting
from such circular causality. This is because in active inference,
interoceptive experience is affected by down-flowing predictions
generated by perceptual content from other cortical areas that
can stimulate behavior to close the gap between expected
interoceptive sensation and current sensation, in an ongoing
attempt to eliminate prediction error.
Seth (2013) describes two distinct functional methods by
which prediction error will be resolved through interoceptive
inference: “Importantly, prediction errors can be minimized
either by updating generative models (perceptual inference and
learning; changing the model to fit the world) or by performing
actions to bring about sensory states in line with predictions
(active inference; changing the world to fit the model).” Barrett
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 March 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 135
Duquette Interoceptive and Psychopathology for Psychotherapists
BOX 3 | DESCRIPTION OF BAYES THEOREM.
Bayes’ Theorem is a mathematical proposition that effectively summarizes the tenets of such models of perception. (Friston and Stephan, 2007) nicely illustrates
Bayes’ Theorem with a “prose” summation: “Given some phenomenon (A) that we want to know about, and an observation (X) that is evidence relating to A, Bayes’
Theorem tells how much we should update our knowledge of A, given the new evidence X.” This update of the knowledge of A occurs repeatedly as we gain more
evidence from each observation to improve the original knowledge. As a “Bayesian observer,” the brain attempts to update its knowledge regarding the phenomena
of inner and outer experience analogous to Bayes’ Theorem; the brain attempts to “know about” inner and outer experience, creating predictions (regarding the
phenomenon A), then evaluating the result of the prediction with an incoming flow of interoceptive information (or an observation X) and making an “update” about
experience (Friston and Stephan, 2007). In other words, the initial observation is considered as a prediction, and the updating of this prediction occurs by taking
stock of the more recent incoming evidence from the body and “calculating” a prediction error between the prediction and afferent (incoming) information, which then
may, or may not, qualitatively change the initial prediction.
and Simmons (2015) expand upon this idea of interoceptive
inference, proposing various neuroanatomic areas that could be
responsible for the neuronal activity that generates prediction
and responds to interoceptive afferent signals, stimulating
prediction errors, and the connectivity patterns underlying the
hierarchical processes. The neuroanatomic complexity of such a
proposal cannot be adequately summarized here, but it is notable
that Barrett and Simmons (2015) agree with Seth’s two listed
proposals, asserting cortical connections are positioned to update
generative models, and propose the thalamus, which is highly
responsive to sensory input, may subsequently activate action
through “signals to the motor system.” They further propose that
a greater minimization of prediction error could occur through
a change in the focus of attention, thus “biasing the influence of
incoming sensory input” through certain network activations in
the brain.
Barrett et al. (2016) address active inference explicitly in
the context of depression, including concepts related to energy
expenditure and management, in a theory labeled, “Embodied
Predictive Interoception Coding model.” Including the concept
of allostasis, the means by which the “brain efficiently maintains
energy regulation of the body,” they organize the concept of
prediction around how accurate initial predictions are and how
effectively the brain reduces prediction error. They assert that
anatomical connections within the limbic system (organized
within a network termed the “salience network”) can influence
the precision of the predictions, allostatically improving the
efficiency of the internal model of the brain regarding
interoceptive signals and the external environment. For example,
salience network connections from the amygdala to the cortex
can “tune” the response of the cortex to incoming predictions
by signaling uncertainty, increasing precision by modulating the
relative gain in neurons in various cortical areas as they compute
prediction error and improving physiological regulation. In the
case of depression, dysfunctional interoceptive ability through
poor interoceptive accuracy, sensitivity, or awareness, and/or
disordered precision through poor salience network precision
weighting on cortical prediction error processing will create
distorted models. Barrett et al. (2016) describe how various
symptoms of depression could be the result of inefficient energy
regulation and disturbed allostasis, resulting from “internal
models with certain characteristics result(ing) in inefficient
energy regulation (either when they are insensitive to prediction
errors and/or when they are subject to poorly calibrated precision
estimates).” They delineate how examples of early life stressors
such as neglect, abuse or limited positive interactions, would
require larger expenditures of energy and establish a model of
the world that is constantly predicting and reacting to internal
(e.g., fatigue, poor nutrition, or physical illness) or external
stressors (e.g., social interactions or isolation) with decreased
metabolic efficiency and poorly regulated energy. Symptoms such
as negative affect, withdrawal, fatigue and poor sleep may result
from such “chronic energy inefficiency and altered interoceptive
signaling” processes (Barrett et al., 2016).
Pezzuolo (2014) presents a predictive coding theory which
incorporates interoceptive, perceptual, and cognitive inference
processes, labelelled “embodied predictive coding,” in an
engaging paper that proposes how physiologic sensation and
subsequent affective experience, might overcome the rational
mind when evaluating reality, sometimes fearfully creating a
“bogeyman” out of whole cloth when there is actually no danger.
Noting “in most cases interoceptive information is quite certain,
so it has a greater influence on the inference,” he notes the relative
weight given to interoceptive signals at any given moment can
distort the predictive coding processing of stimuli from all
sources. He terms this process “embodied predictive coding.” He
describes how such dynamic processes can result in experience
and behavior that reflects the reality of the moment, while at
other times can create significant reality distortion, reflected in
pathological disturbances.
Gu and FitzGerald (2014) describe the value of interoceptive
inference toward minimizing surprise and maintaining
homeostatic balance in the context of decision making and
motivated behavior. They note that “organisms” (we address
the human organism here), seek “out the states they expect
to occupy, where these “familiar” states are innately valuable
(Friston, 2010),” as such familiarity inherently lessens surprise.
Thus, in support of homeostasis during “non-familiar” states,
autonomic reactions are instigated by active inference processes,
and the organism can also perform actions on the world so
as to bring tits internal milieu back to homeostatic balance,
decreasing prediction error in interoceptive inference processes.
They assert that such actions are initiated by interoceptive
inference processes, thereby informing the organism regarding
“value-based choices about the internal state of the (their) body.”
Psychotherapists will recognize behavior resulting from such
“choice” as either intent on self-care, or to use psychotherapeutic
jargon, “acting out.”
Finally, in an imaginative article that presents a discussion
between a philosopher, a theorist and a physicist (Friston et al.,
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2012) in which each writer applies their discipline to address a
neuroscientifically-based theoretical proposal that “all biological
systems are driven to minimize “free energy”” (Friston and
Stephan, 2007; Friston, 2010). Free energy can be conceived of
as surprise, or in psychotherapeutic terms, uncertainty or fear.
While the discussion is imbued with mathematical, scientific and
philosophic terms, the underlying “music” of the discussion at
hand echoes the work of psychotherapy; how do we help our
patients as they struggle to change their model of the world to be
less driven by characteristic responses to fear. Several statements
by the physicist (Friston) supports exploration of this seemingly
complex world of neuroscience by interested therapists. He
writes:
“Avoiding surprises means that one has to model and anticipate
a changing and itinerant world. This implies that the models
used to quantify surprise must themselves embody itinerant
wandering through sensory states (because they have been
selected by exposure to an inconstant world): Under the
free-energy principle, the agent will become an optimal (if
approximate) model of its environment” (Friston et al., 2012).
The infant models their world as best they can while swimming
in a sea of sensation, and through persistent efforts at “pushing
away from fear and dread” (Bar-Levav, 1988), such “agents”
(Friston et al., 2012) will develop models that are expressed
in characteristic perspectives and behaviors that reflect the
“model of its environment” they have created. Friston et al.
(2012) echoes statements by neuroscientists earlier in this
paper (Seth, 2013; Barrett et al., 2016) regarding how human
beings continue on while remaining inherently vulnerable to
the vagaries of life, “surprise can be reduced by changing
sensory input (action), predictions of that input (perception),
or the model per se.” The “physicist” (Friston) also asserts that
“Evolutionary or neurodevelopmental optimization of a model
is distinct from perception and entails changing the form and
architecture of an agent.” Such language addresses the ultimate
goal of psychotherapy regarding therapeutic change reflected in
changes in brain function, evidenced by our patients living more
emotionally open and realistically in the face of the uncertainty
of life. We must not only help our patients “feel” differently, but
must support actual changes in brain function through relational
interaction that will have them live differently, with more realistic
models of the world and reactions fitting to such models.
CONCLUSION
“Oh,” Celeste said with a gasp of tears, as she placed her hand
in the middle of her chest, “Oh, this just feels better.” She was in
her group, and had just been speaking about various issues in her
marriage that troubled her. Her therapist inquired, “What is going
on?” Celeste answered, “It just feels better to put my hand here, over
the part that is cold and can’t be felt. It is so different, it used to be
my whole chest was cold and numb; now it is just this circle right in
the middle of my chest that is cold. It just feels like I am holding it,
that piece of cold, and as I put my hand here it feels better. It’s like
my body is thawing, especially my heart.”
All of life that one encounters is perceived and responded to
within one’s body. It is proposed that subjective experience
results from hierarchical processing of stimuli from the
body and the environment, through complex neural systems
inferring the cause of such stimuli and creating cohesive
“explanations” of such stimuli, with ensuing physiologic
homeostatic regulation. Patients often enter psychotherapy
when over time such methods fail more than they succeed
to regulate their physiology. Dysfunction in the processing
of bodily stimuli, considered in this review as interoceptive
dysfunction, has been evaluated along various research based
dimensions regarding how such dysfunction may present as
symptomatic depression and anxiety. Now, consideration will
be now made of various means psychotherapists have available
through relational interactions to evaluate and include such
research as a backdrop in clinical interventions. Fogel (2009)
uses the term “willingness to be a process” to describe a vital
characteristic developed in psychotherapy. Neuroscience also
recognizes the elemental aspect of process, and is reflected in
research that supports the idea that the work of psychotherapy
is the experiential and relational evaluation of perceptions
and implicit beliefs. Such a view of psychotherapeutic process
could be readily stated in Bayesian terms as the evidence-based
updating of prior beliefs, and persistent efforts to lessen the
distorting influences of feelings on perception, cognitions, and
behavior.
The form of the basic underlying physiological, emotional,
and/or cognitive processes expressed by our patients’ bodies
originates within early attachment relationships and echoes
within their experience throughout their lives. It is these echoes
which psychotherapists listen for, visualize, and imagine, sitting
with their patients, that is, such echoes are the “stuff” of
experiential connection, and can potentially become “audible”
to us and them, through the relational work of therapy. Sitting
across from our patients we can train an evaluative eye on
the level of function in these processes from their outward
manifestations, noting, for example a patient’s breathing, facial
musculature, posture, prosody and pitch of voice, eye contact,
limbmovements, or the look in their eye as theymake eye contact
or not. Van Der Kolk (2014) highlights the import of the therapist
gaining awareness of bodily experience for themselves and for
their patients and its expression in experience. “We can get past
the slipperiness of words by engaging the self-observing, body-
based system, which speaks through sensations, tone of voice, and
body tensions.”
The literature cited regarding interoceptive dysfunction points
to the importance of interoceptive experience that is bounded by
expectations (or predictions) that the world will be a beneficent
place or at least not maleficent, otherwise there is a much
greater likelihood of symptomatic experience. Regarding anxiety,
studies cited propose that high interoceptive accuracy stimulates
an increased likelihood of “catastrophic interpretations” of
physical symptoms (Domschke et al., 2010), with panic an
all too likely consequence. Considering the same dimension
of interoceptive ability regarding depression, low interoceptive
accuracy is reflected in symptoms such as disruptions in decision
making and low positive affect (Furman et al., 2013).
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On the face of it, the likelihood of increased perception of
interoceptive sensations leading to anxiety states, and lower
perception of interoceptive sensation leading to despairing states
seems counterintuitive, as the commonplace description of these
disorders does not immediately appear to reflect this. It is
commonly considered that the symptoms of anxiety occur when
a person is caught unawares by strong bodily sensation with
sudden anxiety or “panic attacks,” while the person who is
depressed strongly experiences body-based vegetative symptoms
of depression and is overwhelmed by the strength of such
feelings. Yet such research findings may reflect, in an operational
sense, the inherent need human beings have to create reasons for
the causes of any experience to limit uncertainty, whether the
reason is realistic, or not. As Pezzuolo (2014) notes, “interoceptive
information is part and parcel of the representation of entities”
(italics in original), a statement which reflects the expression
of the interweaving of interoceptive experience and uncertainty
in top-down prediction of cause, and all efforts to decrease the
unknown by the mind. Clark (2016) also comments on this
statement by Pezzuolo (2014) in a footnote, remarking that
“internal states that become active in the presence of specific
external states of affairs are always richly contextually inflected,”
since any context for an individual is replete with past and present
experiences that can be known or unknown in any present
moment, because, as Clark asserts, “this inflection now seamlessly
combines “objective” and “subjective” (e.g., emotional and body
related) elements.”
The clinical implications of this neuroscientific research
have received little attention in the psychotherapeutic setting.
Increasing the knowledge base of psychotherapists and furthering
awareness of the functional interactions of body and brain toward
the creation of healthy and psychopathological experience
benefits the patient. There is immediate need for the translational
expression of scientific findings into the psychological evaluation
of patients, therapeutic process, and treatment. While it may
seem distant and unrelated to the affective processes that
occur within the psychotherapeutic exchange, neuroscience adds
a unique perspective from which to observe and live such
experience for the therapist and patient. With the therapeutic
relationship as the backdrop, a scientific perspective will support
psychotherapists’ comprehension of their patients’ experience
and the process of change, either through direct information, or
the development of different perspectives from which to observe
and interact with their patients.
The clinical vignettes presented highlight the interplay
between the effects of interoceptive disturbances and the
tightly held predictions reinforced by belief, past history, and
current sensation that seems boundless. Such verbalizations and
behaviors are exhibited by people when they feel safe enough
to express their experience and take a chance with another to
find out if their certainty about any aspect of the experience
is accurate. The resources that therapists have available to help
a patient discern safety within the relationship are sometimes
deceptively simple but activate the body to assess safety, not
insist on danger. One such resource is suggesting the patient
breathe regularly, possibly with a longer exhale than inhale.
Such a process activates the parasympathetic branch of the
ANS (Porges, 2011), and controlled, slowed, breathing has
been shown to decrease negative affect (Zautra et al., 2010). A
suggestion that the patient place their feet on the ground would
facilitate proprioceptive receptors which would send stimuli to
the mid-insula, which integrates salient internal and external
environmental features (Craig, 2011) engendering experience of
a safe physical place and supporting a sense of real stability,
that could lessen the power of other bottom-up sensation to
create “noise” in a system seeking clarity. Finally, eye contact, a
requisite activity in any therapeutic encounter, which Baltazar
et al. (2014) found increased the accuracy of subjects’ rating
of their emotional reaction “with respect to their interoceptive
signals” and is also proposed by this group to promote increased
“self-focused attention,” can substantially encourage openness in
the patient. Within the context of safety, the patient can express
strong feeling, and as Fogel (2009) affirms, “feeling one’s pain or
fear in the subjective emotional present activates the homeostatic
recovery system of the body so that it has the opportunity to take
care of itself.”
Mindfulness, or the practice of meditation or other
contemplative practices, is under evaluation as a means to affect
functional change in interoceptive experience and inference
processes in patients exhibiting depression or anxiety. Vago
(2013) addresses the present moment attention mindfulness
requires and claims it can “enhance capacity for the practitioner
to act congruently with one’s right intentions, direct perceptions,
and intention-focused goals (Kabat-Zinn, 2005; Brown et al.,
2007).” Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) is a process
often taught in manual-based courses, but meditation can take
many forms. While the process of how meditation works to
decrease anxiety or improve mood is still under active discussion,
Holzel et al. (2011), review research concerning the insula, and
find increased activation in individuals after training in MBSR,
and when they were “focused on their momentary experience
(Farb et al., 2007).” While noting that other studies found
increases in activity in the insula and thalamus under different
conditions, they report that “The enhanced sensory processing
has been suggested to represent increased bottom up processing
of the stimulus, that is, awareness of the actual sensation of the
stimulus.”
Using predictive coding as a backdrop, Farb et al. (2015)
discuss the potential positive effects of contemplative practices
on interoceptive inference processes, explicitly with respect
to active inference and perceptual inference (NB: Perceptual
inference: Changing the model to fit the world; active inference:
Changing the world to fit the model; Seth, 2013). They
note that the immediate nature of active inference allows
for “human beings to flexibly and dynamically adapt to the
world in which they are intrinsically embodied.” Alternatively,
perceptual inference presumably has a different extended time
course that allows for increased “ability to notice specific
details of internal sensory experience such as the subtle
changes in sensation,” and subsequent revolutions of these
details through the predictive coding hierarchy could lead
to a more accurate interpretation of the individual’s sensory
experience of the moment. They state that defusing the
more immediate regulation of interoceptive information via
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active inferential processes (e.g., with contemplative practices),
and allowing “iterative cycling between perceptual and active
inferences,” promotes more adaptive behavior results for the
individual (Farb et al., 2015). Such would be the goal of
psychotherapy practice in any theoretical model, with the
lessening of characteristic reactive responses and moment-to-
moment awareness increasing thoughtful and flexible responses
constituting improvement.
Neuroscience researchers are evaluating how mindful
attention to experience in varied contexts may create benefit
reflected in increased ability to self-regulate and purposeful
efforts at decreasing maladaptive behaviors. Gard et al. (2014)
examined the effect of various aspects of yoga practice on the
promotion of psychological health. They address how yoga
practice encourages purposeful focus on the experience of
the body, with an “emphasis toward processing bottom-up
information.” They assert that this could result in “greater
precision of afferent signals as the result of increased sensory
attention,” which they purport would increase perceptual
inference processing of prediction errors in support of learning,
and “thereby lead to extinction of maladaptive behaviors.”
Huffziger et al. (2013) explored the effect of mindful attention
(described as above by Vago, 2013) compared to ruminative
attention in healthy young adults. While the effects of the
study design considered here may appear be self-evident to
any therapist, they do lend support to the expectation that
seemingly minor interventions will generate more significant
effects over time for our patients. Subjects used hand-held
electronic devices carried throughout their day to record their
subjective experience after 3 min periods of mindfulness or
ruminative self-focus on alternating days. A notable finding
was that the 3 min mindful attention period was followed
by no change in mood valence, but “immediately enhanced
momentary calmness.” This finding reflects a significant gain for
the young adult subjects of the experiment as they are developing
habits that could more readily persist through life. Also, since
mindfulness of experience is a goal with any patient, through an
open-hearted, self-observant, and self-accepting internal posture,
such a finding is meaningful for a psychotherapist regarding the
potential effects of a persistent tending to our patients efforts at
self-care. If 3 min periods in a busy day can support calmness in
treatment naïve individuals, the support of efforts to slowly but
surely generate habits of such purposeful attention can benefit
our patients.
Habitual patterns, predictions or inferences are necessary
whether an individual is reaching for the food on a plate in
front of them, walking down a hallway, attending a party,
asking for a raise at work, or relating within an emotionally
intimate experience. Homeostatic state, interoceptive
signaling, motivational salience, prior experience, and current
exteroceptive data from the environment are elements that
create a template for these patterns. Muted awareness of bodily
processes below the head necessarily breeds muted awareness of
life itself. Thus, it is critical for a psychotherapist to consistently
support their patient’s evaluation of the psychotherapeutic
relationship for safety, then resolutely push on into experiences
that cause disruption in their homeostatic balancing processes
through active questioning of their interoceptive experience
and predictive modeling, both of which may be mired in the
past and not allow for the fullest experience of any present
moment.
Psychotherapeutic theories and processes have much to
gain from neuroscience research, deepening the process of
change we witness in our patients as we live with them through
many difficult yet brave encounters with themselves. And
neuroscience research can be enriched by examining how
the psychotherapeutic relationship reshapes physiological
and psychological processes to more accurately and fully
correspond to the present moment. Not only by measurements
of grouped individuals but the undertaking of dialoge with
practitioners involved with individuals in the intimate, life
changing process of psychotherapy. Neuroscientific theory
and research could gain focus through engagement with
clinicians who are exploring human subjective experience
through personal work and the relationship with their
patients, intent on creating physiologic change and the
means to materially discern the “stuff” of predictions,
which, concurrent with other important reparative processes,
changing interoceptive process gone awry on many levels,
stimulating health in the moment to moment experience
of life.
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